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ON ACTUALIZING PUBLIC REASON
Michael Baur*
In this Essay, I examine some apparent difficulties with what I call
the "actualization criterion" connected to Rawls's notion of public
reason, that is, the criterion for determining when Rawlsian public
reason is concretely actualized by citizens in their deliberating and
deciding about constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.
While these apparent difficulties have led some commentators to
reject Rawlsian public reason altogether, I offer an interpretation that
might allow Rawlsian public reason to escape the difficulties. My
reading involves the claim that Rawlsian public reason is to be
understood essentially as an imperative or an ideal, and as not
necessarily grounded in any stock of existing beliefs or opinions. I
make this claim on the basis of the seemingly counterintuitive
observation that it is possible for citizen-interlocutors to know that
public reason has been violated without necessarily knowing who the
violator is (and thus without being able to foreclose the possibility that
the violator may even be oneself). This observation is based in turn
on my analysis of the necessary reciprocity and self-referentiality built
in to the very concept of public reason as such.
I. THE APPARENT PARADOXES OF PUBLIC REASON
In Lecture VI of Political Liberalism, Rawls tells us that his notion
of "public reason" is suggested by Immanuel Kant's distinction
between public and private reason in the 1784 essay, What Is
Enlightenment?, and is related to Kant's discussion in the Critique of
Pure Reason regarding "The Discipline of Reason with Regard to Its
Polemical Use."' But Rawls's overt reference to Kant in this regard
immediately raises some questions, since the Rawlsian notion of
public reason seems to be at odds with what Kant actually says. This
is because the Rawlsian notion of public reason focuses on the limits
that are to be placed on the kinds of reasons to which citizens may
legitimately appeal when deliberating and making decisions publicly
about constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. By
contrast, Kant seems to argue that reason itself is essentially public
* Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Natural Law Colloquium,
Fordham University; Ph.D., University of Toronto (Philosophy); J.D., Harvard Law
School.
1. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 213 n.2 (1996).
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and unrestricted and that no limits whatsoever should be placed on
what might be debated and decided by free citizens. In An Answer to
the Question: What is Enlightenment?, Kant clearly states that citizens
should be free to discuss and deliberate about anything, provided only
that they remain obedient to existing law.2 For Kant, the proper
imperative for citizens should be: "Argue as much as you will, and
about whatever you will, but obey!"3
Furthermore, in the section of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason to
which Rawls refers, Kant explains that reason consists essentially in
the freedom to subject all things whatsoever to unrestricted critique,
and that such critique allows no room for any prohibited topics or
sacred cows, even if personal sensitivities or social utility might seem
to be threatened by such far-reaching critique.4 Kant writes:
Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and
cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition
without damaging itself and drawing upon itself a disadvantageous
suspicion. Now there is nothing so important because of its utility,
nothing so holy, that it may be exempted from this searching review
and inspection, which knows no respect for persons. The very
existence of reason depends upon this freedom, which has no
dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never anything more than
the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express
his reservations, indeed even his veto, without holding back.5
In an earlier and parallel passage found in the Preface to the 1781
edition of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes a similar point
about the right-and even the duty-of reason to subject all things
(including those pertaining to religion and public legislation) to
unrestricted critical scrutiny:
Our age is the genuine age of criticism, to which everything must
submit. Religion through its holiness and legislation through its
majesty commonly seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this
way they excite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay
claim to that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which
has been able to withstand its free and public examination.6
Thus we have here what might be called a textual or bibliographical
paradox, since the Kantian passages to which Rawls refers seem to
contradict the spirit of Rawls's own notion of "public reason." But
the Rawlsian account of public reason seems to involve more than just
2. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?,
Berlinische Monatsschrift, Dec. 1784, reprinted in Immanuel Kant: Practical
Philosophy 15, 18 (Mary J. Gregor trans. & ed., 1996).
3. Id.
4. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 643 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood
trans. & eds., Cambridge University Press, 1997) (1781 & 1787).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 100 n.*.
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this textual paradox. As Rawls himself recognizes, there also seems to
be a theoretical paradox surrounding his notion of public reason.
How can it be reasonable or rational, Rawls asks, to say that citizens
should appeal "only to a public conception of justice and not to the
whole truth as they see it"7 when they discuss and decide on matters
as important as constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice?
"Surely," Rawls writes rhetorically, "the most fundamental questions
should be settled by appealing to the most important truths" 8-- and
yet it is these most important truths that apparently must be declared
off limits or taken off the table because of the requirements of public
reason.
In addressing the paradox, Rawls reminds us that the exercise of
public reason has to do with the reason of free and equal citizens who,
as a collective body, deliberate about and decide on constitutional
essentials and matters of basic justice. And it is through such
deliberation and decision making (e.g., in enacting laws and in
amending their constitution) that such free and equal citizens
"exercise final political and coercive power over one another."9 The
idea here is that, because the power being exercised is final and
coercive, it should not be imposed on those subject to it in an external
or dogmatic fashion, but instead should be exercised on the basis of
principles and ideals that can be made justifiable to the persons who
are subject to it. As Kent Greenawalt has written, the idea behind the
requirement that the coercive power of the law should be based on
public reason alone is "that people should not be compelled on the
basis of reasons that are not persuasive for them."' Along these lines,
Rawls holds that political power should be exercised in accordance
with what he calls "the liberal principle of legitimacy," which states:
"[O]ur exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of
which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light
of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and
rational."" And to the extent that citizens are reasonable and
rational, they "should be ready to explain the basis of their actions to
one another [e.g., their decisions about constitutional essentials and
7. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 216.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
10. Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Public Reasons, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 531, 535
(2002).
11. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 217. But see id. at 137 (stating a
slightly different formulation of the liberal principle of legitimacy: "[O]ur exercise of
political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a
constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be
expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common
human reason").
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basic issues of justice] in terms each could reasonably expect that
others might endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality.
12
In addition to the liberal principle of legitimacy, the ideal of
democratic citizenship implied by the notion of public reason entails a
(moral) duty of civility among citizens. This duty of civility includes
not only the duty to "to be able to explain to one another on those
fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate
and vote for can be supported by the political values of public
reason"; it also includes the duty to be willing to listen to others and to
be fair-minded "in deciding when accommodations to their views
should reasonably be made." 3 Rawls goes on to explain how the
apparent theoretical paradox concerning public reason can be
resolved, once one understands what is meant by an overlapping
consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. An overlapping
consensus is not a mere modus vivendi; that is to say, it is not a mere
compromise that is struck on the basis of self- or group-interest. 4
Rather, an overlapping consensus remains stable-in spite of changing
compromises and shifts in the distribution of political power-because
the political conception of justice that belongs to an overlapping
consensus is genuinely supported by the individual citizens
themselves, and the citizens endorse such a conception "on moral
grounds" in spite of their differing and even conflicting
comprehensive views. 5
For Rawls, then, an overlapping consensus exists when "citizens
who affirm reasonable but opposing comprehensive doctrines"
endorse a properly political "conception of justice as giving the
content of their political judgments on basic institutions" and when
"unreasonable comprehensive doctrines ... do not gain enough
currency to undermine society's essential justice."' 6 If there exists an
overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines and if
each of these reasonable comprehensive doctrines can support and
include within itself (as a kind of "module") a properly political
conception of justice, then there is nothing odd or paradoxical about
public reason and the limits prescribed by it. Indeed, the idea of an
overlapping consensus-when properly understood-entails that
public reason must place certain limits on the kind of principles to
which citizens may appeal in deliberating and deciding on
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Thus Rawls
writes:
[W]hen the political conception [of justice] is supported by an
overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, the
12. Id. at 218.
13. Id. at 217.
14. Id. at 147.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 39.
2156 [Vol. 72
ON ACTUALIZING PUBLIC REASON
paradox of public reason disappears. The union of the duty of
civility with the great values of the political yields the ideal of
citizens governing themselves in ways that each thinks the others
might reasonably be expected to accept; and this ideal in turn is
supported by the comprehensive doctrines reasonable persons
affirm. 7
Given the normative significance of the idea of an overlapping
consensus, there is nothing strange about holding that the most
fundamental matters affecting citizens in a liberal democracy (e.g.,
matters pertaining to constitutional essentials and basic justice) should
not be decided on the basis of "the most important truths" or "the
whole truth" as citizens might see it from the differing perspectives of
their comprehensive doctrines. Rawls seeks to illustrate why the
"paradox of public reason" disappears by referring to familiar political
and legal situations in which "we recognize a duty not to decide in
view of the whole truth" and which show "how it is often perfectly
reasonable to forswear the whole truth" in some instances. a8 For
example, the rules of evidence place limits on the kinds of testimony
that may be introduced at a criminal trial-and thus place limits on
our otherwise acceptable urge to know and to act on the basis of the
whole truth. 9 As Rawls puts the point in his 1997 essay, The Idea of
Public Reason Revisited: "I propose that in public reason
comprehensive doctrines of truth or right be replaced by an idea of
the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens.... The zeal
to embody the whole truth in politics is incompatible with an idea of
public reason that belongs with democratic citizenship.520
II. IS THE RAWLSIAN "ACTUALIZATION CRITERION"
INTERNAL/SUBJECTIVE OR EXTERNAL/OBJECTIVE?
The preceding part displayed how a cluster of inter-related concepts
is integral to a proper understanding of Rawls's account of public
reason. This cluster of concepts included: a political conception of
justice, an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive
doctrines, the liberal principle of legitimacy, the duty of civility, and
the ideal of democratic citizenship. Even without delving further into
17. Id. at 218.
18. Id. at 219.
19. Id. at 218. There are some commentators who would reject this analogy
between public reason and the rules of evidence. Leif Wenar, for example, argues
that Rawlsian public reason does more than simply require that citizens appeal in
public to only part of what they believe. For Wenar, Rawlsian public reason also
requires (even if implicitly) that citizens appeal in public to reasons that in some cases
actually contradict their comprehensive doctrines. Leif Wenar, Political Liberalism:
An Internal Critique, 106 Ethics 32, 62 (1995).
20. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765
(1997), reprinted in John Rawls: Collected Papers 573, 574 (Samuel Freeman ed.,
1999).
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the meaning and inter-relations of these concepts, it is possible to
raise some illuminating questions about the notion of Rawlsian public
reason. I wish to raise such questions by asking about the Rawlsian
criterion for determining whether or not in any particular concrete
situation public reason is being properly actualized in the
deliberations and decision making of the citizens (I shall call this the
"actualization criterion"). In The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,
Rawls seems to provide a relatively clear and straightforward
statement of the actualization criterion. He writes:
[a] A citizen engages in public reason, then, when he or she
deliberates within a framework of what he or she sincerely regards
as the most reasonable political conception of justice, [b] a
conception that expresses political values that others, as free and
equal citizens might also reasonably be expected reasonably to
endorse.21
Now we can ask a number of important questions about this
criterion. For example, under the criterion, is it sufficient that a
citizen deliberate within a framework that he or she sincerely regards
as the most reasonable political conception of justice? Or is sincere
belief insufficient, and must it also be the case that the citizen
deliberate within a framework that as a matter of fact is the most
reasonable, or that at least is a reasonable conception of justice? The
first part of the criterion given above (starting at the letter [a]) seems
to support what we might call the "internal" or "subjective" reading of
the actualization criterion: According to this reading, the idea of
public reason requires only that the citizen deliberate within a
framework of what he or she internally (or subjectively) and sincerely
regards as reasonable. But the second, appositional part of the
criterion given above (starting at the letter [b]) seems to support what
we might call an "external" or "objective" reading of the criterion:
According to this reading, it is not sufficient that the citizen deliberate
within a framework of what he or she sincerely regards as reasonable;
the proper exercise of public reason also requires that this framework
actually be a reasonable and properly political conception of justice,
one that expresses political values that others might reasonably (and
not just sincerely) be expected reasonably to endorse.
The ambiguity indicated above, it seems, cannot be resolved on
strictly textual grounds alone, since Rawls's various statements on the
matter are not univocal. Some passages in Rawls seem to support an
internal/subjective reading of the actualization criterion, while others
seem to support an external/objective reading. For example, in
support of the internal/subjective reading, one can turn to the
following passage in Political Liberalism:
21. Id. at 581.
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[P]ublic reason does not ask us to accept the very same principles of
justice, but rather to conduct our fundamental discussions in terms
of what we regard as a political conception. We should sincerely
think that our view of the matter is based on political values
everyone can reasonably be expected to endorse. For an electorate
thus to conduct itself is a high ideal the following of which realizes
fundamental democratic values not to be abandoned simply because
full agreement does not obtain. A vote can be held on a
fundamental question as on any other; and if the question is debated
by appeal to political values and citizens vote their sincere opinion,
the ideal is sustained.22
For further support in favor of an internal/subjective reading, one
can refer also to The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in which Rawls
states that the ideal of public reason
is realized, or satisfied, whenever judges, legislators, chief
executives, and other government officials, as well as candidates for
public office [and also citizens acting and thinking of themselves as
legislators], act from and follow the idea of public reason and
explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting fundamental
political positions in terms of the political conception of justice they
regard as the most reasonable.
23
But several other passages in Rawls's work seem to support an
external/objective reading of the actualization criterion. For example,
in a subsequent passage from The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,
Rawls states that the proper exercise of political power supported by
public reason requires not just subjectively sincere belief, but also
objectively reasonable belief insofar as the reasons offered by one
citizen can also be reasonably endorsed by other citizens: "Our
exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe
that the reasons we would offer for our political actions-were we to
state them as government officials-are sufficient, and we also
reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those
reasons."24 In spite of the textual ambiguity on the matter, there are
good systemic and theoretical reasons to opt for an external/objective
reading of the actualization criterion. After all, a merely
internal/subjective criterion would seem to entail the utter
privatization or subjectivization of public reason. For under a merely
internal/subjective reading of the actualization criterion, citizens could
be said to meet the requirements of public reason just so long as they
sincerely believed that they were operating with a conception of justice
that expressed political values that others might also reasonably be
22. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 241 (emphasis added).
23. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 20, at 576 (emphasis
added).
24. Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
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expected reasonably to endorse (even if such sincere belief were not,
as a matter of fact, "objectively" reasonable).
But even if one were to opt for an external/objective reading of the
actualization criterion, further problems remain. As we have seen,
under the external/objective reading of the actualization criterion, it is
not sufficient that the citizen deliberate within a framework of what
he or she sincerely regards as the most reasonable political conception
of justice. The proper exercise of public reason also requires that this
framework actually be a properly political conception of justice, one
which expresses political values that others might reasonably (and not
just sincerely) be expected reasonably to endorse. When is a citizen
being not only sincere, but also "objectively reasonable" in his or her
expectation that others will endorse the values expressed by his or her
own political conception of justice? In The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited, Rawls provides what we-at least for our present
purposes-might regard as a "reasonableness criterion." Rawls
writes:
Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal
in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared
to offer one another fair terms of cooperation according to what they
consider the most reasonable conception of political justice; and
when they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own
interests in particular situations, provided that other citizens also
accept those terms. 25
Notice that the central condition specified in this criterion (namely,
that citizens be "prepared to offer one another fair terms of
cooperation according to what they consider the most reasonable
conception of political justice") 6 is a merely subjective or internal
condition. But furthermore, the seemingly "external" or "objective"
condition specified in this criterion ("provided that other citizens also
accept those terms") qualifies only the requirement that citizens
"agree to act" on the terms of cooperation that they themselves have
offered. 7 In other words, Rawls adds this qualifying requirement in
order to make clear that citizens are obligated to act on the terms that
they themselves have offered as "fair terms of cooperation, ' 28 but that
they are thus obligated only so long as other citizens also accept those
terms. Accordingly, this seemingly "external" or "objective"
condition (that other citizens also accept the terms offered) does not
yield the position that a citizen is being "reasonable" only if other
citizens actually accept the terms of cooperation offered by him or
her. (Even if it did yield this position, this position would be
problematic for yet other reasons: Why should one citizen's
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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reasonableness depend on the fact that other citizens happen to agree
with the terms of cooperation offered by him or her?) Thus, when all
is said and done, this Rawlsian reasonableness criterion seems to
require little more than sincere, subjective belief.
What might have initially appeared to be an external/objective
requirement within the reasonableness criterion given above is shown
upon further analysis to be reducible to a merely internal/subjective
requirement. And the same sort of difficulty seems to threaten even
Rawls's criterion of reciprocity. Explaining the criterion of
reciprocity, Rawls writes:
The criterion of reciprocity requires that when those terms are
proposed [by citizens] as the most reasonable terms of fair
cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at least
reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and
not as dominated and manipulated, or under the pressure of an
inferior political or social position.29
As Rawls later observes, "the criterion of reciprocity is an essential
ingredient specifying public reason and its content."3 ° But while the
criterion of reciprocity is crucial to public reason, it nevertheless
seems to depend ultimately on a merely "internal" or "subjective"
requirement, namely that a citizen "must also think it at least
reasonable" for others to accept the terms of cooperation which he or
she has offered them.31 In light of the preceding observations, it is not
clear how the Rawlsian actualization criterion, reasonableness
criterion, or criterion of reciprocity can really provide more than
essentially "internal" or "subjective" requirements.
Samuel Freeman, in his contribution to this issue of the Fordham
Law Review, correctly notes that, in Rawlsian political liberalism, the
notion of reasonableness "stands in for" or takes the place of the
notion of truth.32 But as we have just seen, Rawls's account of public
reason seems to come dangerously close to allowing the notion of
"subjective sincerity" to stand in for the notion of "publicness" or
"reasonableness." Freeman goes on to assert that for Rawls,
"reasonable principles" are those principles that "are generally
acceptable to conscientious, informed, and morally motivated moral
agents."33 But this seemingly external/objective set of requirements
for reasonableness does not address the problem at hand. First of all,
the generic requirement that "reasonable principles" be "generally
acceptable" cannot-on its own-provide any grounds for
distinguishing principles that a broad majority happens to find
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 609.
31. Id. at 578.
32. Samuel Freeman, Public Reason and Political Justifications, 72 Fordham L.
Rev. 2021, 2023 (2004).
33. Id.
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acceptable, and those that are genuinely reasonable. And as we know
from the history of slavery and racial discrimination in our own
country, what may be "generally acceptable" is not co-extensive-or
at least should not be co-extensive-with what we take to be
"reasonable." Indeed, if the "generally acceptable" were supposed to
be co-extensive with "the reasonable," then a political liberalism
based on such a view of "reasonable principles" would be virtually
indistinguishable from sheer majoritarianism: The majority's will
would always determine "the reasonable." Freeman's further
requirement that reasonable principles be generally acceptable to
persons who are "morally motivated"34 does not offer any helpful new
content beyond a mere "subjective sincerity" requirement. Finally,
the additional requirement that reasonable principles be generally
acceptable to "informed" persons remains normatively vacuous as
long as it is not tied to some normatively significant "truths" or "facts"
by means of which persons could be said to be "informed" in the
relevant respects. But as Freeman has correctly noted, Rawls aims to
provide a political conception of justice and an account of public
reason that does not rely on any comprehensive doctrines or
normatively significant "truths."35 In summary, the attempt to identify
a plausible "actualization criterion" for Rawlsian public reason seems
doomed to founder between two unpalatable options: the
requirement of mere "subjective sincerity" (on the one hand) and the
requirement of some sort of normative "truth" (on the other hand).36
III. FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT DETERMINING WHEN PUBLIC
REASON HAS BEEN VIOLATED
The preceding part raised some critical questions about identifying
a criterion for determining whether, in any particular concrete
situation, Rawlsian public reason is being properly actualized by the
deliberations and decision-making of the citizens (the "actualization
criterion"). In this part, I intend to raise some further and related
questions. My ultimate aim is not to reject Rawlsian public reason as
such, but rather to suggest a different way of understanding it, a way
that may render Rawlsian public reason more plausible and
defensible, even in light of the critical questions being raised here.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 2038-43.
36. This critical conclusion about the "actualization criterion" roughly echoes
Onora O'Neill's observation that Rawlsian constructivism in general seems
uncomfortably trapped "[b]etween realism and relativism." See Onora O'Neill,
Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy 218 (1989).
O'Neill writes: "Rawlsian constructivism has ended up on an uncomfortable knife
edge, and teeters between idealizing and relativized conceptions of ethics. The
idealized readings demand proofs of a moral reality Rawls does not discern; the
relativized readings can only offer an internal critique of the justice of [existing]
modern liberal societies." Id.
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The two questions with which I would like to begin in this part are
related to the questions already raised about the actualization
criterion. The two inter-related questions are as follows:
1) If the Rawlsian actualization criterion is indeed problematic for
the reasons discussed above, then on what grounds-if ever-may one
legitimately complain that another citizen's attempts to persuade or
influence others within a public forum (and on matters pertaining to
constitutional essentials or basic justice) are unreasonable or exceed
the limits of public reason, if that citizen (let us call him "George"
henceforth) subjectively and sincerely believes that he is being
reasonable and is operating within the limits prescribed by Rawlsian
public reason?
2) Conversely, if the Rawlsian actualization criterion is problematic
for the reasons discussed above, then on what grounds-if ever-may
one legitimately complain that another citizen's refusal to be open to
persuasion within a public forum (and on matters pertaining to
constitutional essentials or basic justice) is unreasonable or violates
the duty of civility, if that citizen (let us call her "Judith" henceforth)
subjectively and sincerely believes that she is being open and honoring
the duty of civility, as prescribed by Rawlsian public reason?
The questions sketched above help to highlight one of the central
difficulties of Rawlsian public reason: Just as two or more citizen-
interlocutors can debate and disagree on constitutional essentials and
matters of basic justice, so too can they debate and disagree on the
question of whether any particular citizen (either oneself or another)
is genuinely living up to the requirements of public reason. In other
words, citizen-interlocutors can debate and disagree not only about
fundamental political matters, but also about the very terms of their
debating and disagreeing (qua citizens). More specifically, they can
debate and disagree on whether the terms of discourse presupposed
by one or another citizen-interlocutor do or do not satisfy the
requirements of public reason. Now, it is obvious that the question of
whether a particular citizen's discursive practices do or do not satisfy
the requirements of public reason cannot be settled simply on the
basis of whether a certain critical mass of other citizens happens to
agree or disagree with that citizen (either on basic political matters or
on the meaning of "public reason" itself). For the notion of "public
reason" is a normative notion: Instead of simply mirroring actual
agreements or disagreements among citizens, the notion of public
reason is supposed to specify normatively significant guidelines for
determining how agreement and/or disagreement among citizens (qua
citizens) ought to take place to begin with.
The issue is complicated by the fact that an individual's own
understanding of public reason (and in turn, his or her sincere belief
that he or she is satisfying the requirements of public reason) may
depend indirectly on some portion of his or her comprehensive view.
2004] 2163
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Consider the following analysis involving George and Judith.
George's sincere, subjective beliefs about whether he is being
reasonable and is operating within the limits prescribed by public
reason seem to depend in part on his views regarding whether he
really can reasonably expect others reasonably to endorse the
positions that he himself holds on constitutional essentials and matters
of basic justice (let us refer to these views as his views on the
"reasonable endorsability" of his basic political positions). In turn,
George's sincere, subjective beliefs about the reasonable endorsability
of his basic political positions seem to depend in part on his views
regarding the nature and general accessibility of the evidence that
might lead another person to accept George's basic political positions
(let us refer to these views as his views on the "evidentiary grounds"
of his basic political positions). Finally, George's sincere, subjective
beliefs about the evidentiary grounds of his basic political positions
seem to depend in part on his beliefs about matters such as the nature
and capacity of human reason, the possible objectivity or
"knowability" of moral truth, the normative significance and value of
certain facts of nature, and so forth. But beliefs about these matters
are philosophical, epistemological, and/or axiological in nature, and
would be placed by Rawls "outside" the scope of public reason,
insofar as they belong to a (fully or partially) comprehensive
doctrine.37
To summarize this analysis: George's sincere, subjective beliefs
about whether he is being reasonable and operating within the limits
prescribed by public reason seem to depend on his views regarding
"reasonable endorsability," which seem to depend in turn on his views
regarding "evidentiary grounds," which seem to depend in turn on his
comprehensive view.38 Thus George's comprehensive view seems (at
least in part) to determine his sincere, subjective beliefs about
whether he is or is not being reasonable and operating within the
limits prescribed by public reason when he attempts to persuade
37. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 175.
38. Against Rawls, it is tempting to argue along the following lines: "If a person
happens to believe some proposition (let's call it X), then it is obvious that he also
believes in the reasonable endorsability of X (since he clearly considers himself to be
reasonable in endorsing X - if he did not consider himself reasonable in doing so,
then he would cease to endorse X!). And if the person believes in the reasonable
endorsability of X, then he must also believe that it is reasonable for him to try to
convince others of X." My claims here have not been based on this sort of argument,
and my notion of "reasonable endorsability" here pertains to the question of what can
be reasonably endorsed, not just by myself or by some generic, imaginary substitute
for myself, but by persons who may actually be quite different from myself. It seems
to me that the sort of argument given above does not make an adequate case against
Rawls. After all, a person may very well consider himself to be reasonable in
endorsing X, even though he might also hold (for any number of other reasons, e.g.,
for reasons connected to his views on the "evidentiary grounds" of his belief in X)
that he would be unreasonable if he tried to persuade others of X.
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others (on matters pertaining to constitutional essentials or basic
justice) within a public forum.39 This sort of analysis has led some
thinkers to conclude that Rawls's notion of public reason is ultimately
untenable and must be rejected in favor of a position that more
overtly allows-or perhaps even encourages-comprehensive
doctrines to play a determining role in public deliberation and
decision making on constitutional essentials and matters of basic
justice." But for now at least, I would like to steer this analysis in a
slightly different direction. And in order to do this, I would like to
begin by considering matters from the perspective of Judith as well.
According to a corollary requirement of public reason, Judith has a
duty of civility, a duty to listen and be open to George's attempts at
persuasion, provided that George himself is being reasonable and
observing the limits prescribed by public reason. Now Judith's
sincere, subjective beliefs about whether or not she is being genuinely
open and honoring the duty of civility-even if it turns out that she is
not persuaded by George-seem to depend in part on her own views
regarding the reasonable endorsability of George's basic political
positions (i.e., his positions on constitutional essentials and matters of
basic justice). In turn, Judith's sincere, subjective beliefs about the
reasonable endorsability of George's basic political positions seem to
depend in part on her views regarding the "evidentiary grounds" of
George's basic political positions. And finally, Judith's sincere,
subjective beliefs about the evidentiary grounds of George's basic
political positions seem to depend in part on her own (fully or
partially) comprehensive (i.e., philosophical, epistemological, and/or
axiological) views. Thus we see that Judith's position on the question
of whether she is being reasonable and honoring the duty of civility is
the mirror image of George's position on the question of whether he is
being reasonable and operating within the limits prescribed by public
reason. Each person's answer to the question at hand (regarding
whether he or she is himself or herself living up to the requirements of
public reason) seemingly depends (at least in part) on his or her own
comprehensive view. But there is an additional symmetry here:
Judith's beliefs about whether George is being reasonable and
honoring the requirements of public reason seem to depend (at least
in part) on her own comprehensive view; and George's beliefs about
whether Judith is being reasonable and honoring the requirements of
public reason seem to depend at least in part on his own
39. In a somewhat similar vein, Kent Greenawalt has argued that "comprehensive
views can influence someone's sense of the application of fundamental values"; thus
comprehensive views can influence a person's ideas regarding which sorts of issues
actually do (or don't) belong to what Rawls calls "constitutional essentials." Kent
Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons 117 (1995).
40. See, e.g., Robert George, In Defense of Natural Law 196-227 (1999); see also
John Finnis, Abortion, Natural Law, and Public Reason, in Natural Law and Public
Reason 75 (Robert P. George & Christopher Wolfe eds., 2000).
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comprehensive view. In short, George's judgments about whether
public reason is properly being actualized by himself and/or by Judith
apparently depend (at least in part) on his own comprehensive views;
and Judith's judgments about whether public reason is being properly
actualized by herself and/or by George apparently depend (at least in
part) on her own comprehensive view.
Now let us suppose that George and Judith not only disagree about
some fundamental political issue (e.g., abortion), but also disagree
about the nature, scope, and limits of public reason. What ought to
happen if George and Judith start to suspect that their disagreement
about the very terms of their disagreement (their disagreement about
public reason itself) depends on the different and even opposing
comprehensive views that they each hold? It is clear that the two
cannot simply "agree to disagree," since that would reduce their
relationship to a mere modus vivendi, which-as we have already
seen-is excluded by the Rawlsian account of public reason as
sustained by an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive
views. But it also seems that the two cannot simply agree (e.g.,
through a common moral commitment to ongoing civil discourse) that
certain topics defy reasonable agreement and thus should be excluded
from what counts as "public reason" for them. For the disagreement
in which the two are already engaged is itself precisely about the
nature, scope, and limits of "public reason"!
Let us further suppose that in his further attempts to persuade
Judith, George begins to "dig deeper" into his repertoire of
comprehensive views, hoping to give a more complete and compelling
account of his positions, and hoping to demonstrate the sincerity of his
commitment to these positions. In the midst of his "deeper digging,"
George remains convinced that he is successfully translating the
lessons of his comprehensive views into properly political reasons; and
so George remains convinced that he has satisfied "the proviso"
requirement of Rawlsian public reason.41 Now, at what point in
George's ongoing attempts can Judith legitimately complain that
George is not being reasonable and is overstepping the limits
prescribed by public reason? And conversely, at what point in this
interchange can George legitimately complain that Judith-in spite of
George's sincere attempts to satisfy the proviso-is not being open-
minded and thus is not honoring the duty of civility required by public
reason?
Before going further, it will be helpful to reinforce the point that
George and Judith are to be understood as ideal types. They
represent the situation of any citizen insofar as he or she--qua
41. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 20, at 591-94. For
more on Rawls's "inclusive view" of public reason (according to which citizens may
sometimes introduce their own comprehensive views into public reason), see Rawis,
Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 247-54.
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citizen-seeks to live up to the requirements of public reason while
attempting (like George) to persuade others, or while being (like
Judith) at the receiving end of such attempts at persuasion. George
and Judith should not be understood individualistically, but may refer
to entire groups of citizens who are bound together insofar as they are
participants (speakers or listeners) in a broad public conversation
about constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, and
perhaps even about public reason itself. Finally, this broad public
conversation should not even be understood as if it were
unidirectional; for as we all know from our own experience, it is quite
possible to be a George and a Judith at once, even in the midst of a
single conversation.
In applying these ideal types, we have seen that a major difficulty
arises in connection with George's ongoing attempts to persuade
Judith. George may continue trying to persuade Judith about his
basic political positions; he may also continue trying to persuade her
about the limits and scope of public reason itself (about the very terms
of their discursive practice). Indeed, George's very commitment to
public reason may lead him quite reasonably to hold that he may not
legitimately give up on his attempts to persuade Judith regarding the
proper meaning of public reason; for-he may reasonably believe-to
renounce the imperative to reach agreement on the meaning of public
reason itself is to allow his relationship with Judith to devolve into a
mere modus vivendi whereby the two simply "agree to disagree" for
external, utilitarian reasons. But if George and Judith already
disagree about the limits and scope of public reason, then is it not the
case that George's ongoing attempts at persuasion (especially if they
involve any "deeper digging" into his own comprehensive views) will
appear to Judith as themselves a violation of public reason (the very
opposite of what George takes them to be)? At what point can Judith
legitimately complain that George is overstepping the limits of public
reason; at what point can George legitimately complain that Judith is
not genuinely open and is thus violating her duty of civility?
It is obvious that there must be at least some point at which either
George or Judith may legitimately complain that the other is not
living up to what is required by public reason. For if Judith could not
legitimately complain that George is exceeding the proper limits of
public reason, or if George could not legitimately complain that Judith
is not honoring the duty of civility (e.g., if it were Judith's
unreasonable close-mindedness that led her to accuse George of
exceeding the limits of public reason), then public reason would be
devoid of all meaningful normative content for George and Judith. In
order to have meaningful normative content for them, the notion of
public reason (and its corollary principles) must disallow both George
and Judith from acting in certain ways. Furthermore, if the notion of
public reason is to have any meaningful normative content for them,
2004] 2167
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
then it must be possible for George and Judith to disagree on which of
the two of them is failing to live up to what is required by the ideal of
public reason and yet nevertheless-in the midst of such
disagreement-for one of them to be correct. For if it were not
possible for them to disagree on which of the two of them is failing to
live up the requirements of public reason, then the need to appeal to
the notion of public reason (in order to settle such a disagreement)
would never arise for them in the first place; in that case, the notion of
public reason would be normatively meaningless, superfluous, and
useless for them. Furthermore, if it were not possible for one of them
to be correct in this disagreement, then-once again-the notion of
public reason would be devoid of meaningful normative content for
them; for if it were not possible for one of them to be correct in saying
that the other has violated the requirements of public reason (i.e., if it
were not possible for one of them actually to have violated the
requirements of public reason), then once again the notion of public
reason would not disallow them from acting in certain ways, in which
case it would be normatively vacuous for them.
IV. SELF-REFERENTIALITY, RECIPROCITY, AND How ONE CAN
KNOW ON IMMANENT GROUNDS THAT PUBLIC REASON HAS BEEN
VIOLATED
In the preceding part we began to see that the notion of public
reason can involve a certain kind of self-referentiality: citizen-
interlocutors may debate and disagree not only about constitutional
essentials and matters of basic justice, but also about the very terms of
their debate and disagreement. That is, in the midst of their attempts
to discuss fundamental political issues within the limits prescribed by
public reason, they can also debate and disagree about the very
nature, scope, and limits of public reason itself. But public reason can
also involve a further, related kind of self-referentiality: If citizens
(represented here by George and Judith) happen to disagree about
the nature, scope, and limits of public reason, then one citizen's
sincere commitment to living up to the requirements of public reason
may lead him or her to engage in discursive behavior that, from the
perspective of another citizen, will count as evidence that he or she is
precisely not committed to public reason but indeed acting in violation
of it. For example, if George and Judith disagree fundamentally
about the nature and requirements of public reason, then George's
subjectively sincere commitment to public reason and his ongoing
attempts to prevent his relationship with Judith from devolving into a
mere modus vivendi (i.e., his ongoing attempts to persuade Judith,
either about political issues or about public reason itself) may appear
to Judith as evidence that George is being unreasonable and precisely
not living up to the requirements of public reason. Conversely,
Judith's subjectively sincere commitment to public reason and her
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insistence that George should be disallowed from making certain
kinds of arguments in a public forum may appear to George as
evidence that Judith is being uncivil and precisely not living up to the
requirements of public reason.
But there is a further issue here, connected to the traditional
problem of ideology or the apparently self-validating character of the
views or stances that a citizen adopts: A citizen's existing stance will
incline him or her to regard new evidence (including evidence
presented by sincere others that could potentially disconfirm one's
existing stance) as evidence that confirms the rightness of the stance
that one has taken. So in the context of their ongoing disagreement,
George's existing stance regarding public reason will incline him to
regard Judith's attempts to limit his public arguments as evidence of
her incivility, and thus as confirming his view that he is justified in
dismissing her protestations as unreasonable. Conversely, Judith's
existing stance regarding public reason will incline her to regard
George's ongoing attempts at persuading her as evidence that he is
unreasonable, and thus confirming her view that she is justified in
dismissing his ongoing attempts at persuasion as unreasonable. Or to
state the matter the other way around: Judith's discursive behavior
will tend to confirm for George the rightness of his own position on
public reason, but only because George himself has already taken the
particular stance that he has; and George's discursive behavior will
tend to confirm for Judith the rightness of her own view on public
reason, but only because Judith herself has already taken the
particular stance that she has." Is there a way to give a fair and non-
prejudicial answer to the question of which of the two is failing to live
up to the requirements of public reason, given the apparently self-
validating character of the stances adopted by George and Judith (and
the citizens represented by them)?
42. With these observations about the seemingly self-validating character of the
particular stances that one takes, we are-interestingly enough-echoing Immanuel
Kant. For Kant showed in his Critique of Pure Reason that the difficulties to which
human reason falls prey will continue to seem irresolvable only if one persists in
adhering to the pre-critical stance or view that human reason is passive in relation to
the things it knows. For Kant, the fact that human reason continually falls into such
difficulties leads reason to think that it is confirmed in its view that it is, indeed, the
passive "victim" of mysterious forces and causes beyond itself; but reason regards
such difficulties as confirmatory evidence only because of the particular stance or
view that it has already taken with regard to itself. As Kant argues, if one were to
take an altogether different stance and initiate a shift in one's thinking (i.e., if one
were to perform a "Copernican revolution"), then the seemingly irresolvable
difficulties and thus the seemingly confirmatory evidence about reason's passivity
would altogether disappear. For Kant, things appear as they do to the pre-critical
mind, precisely because of the stance that the pre-critical mind takes in relation to
things; if one were to adopt a different (critical) stance regarding things, then things
would also appear differently to the mind. Kant, supra note 4, at 106-24.
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We saw in the preceding part that if public reason is to have any
normatively significant content for George and Judith there must be
some point at which Judith could legitimately complain that George is
exceeding the proper limits of public reason, and some point at which
George could legitimately complain that Judith is not honoring the
duty of civility, as required by public reason. Now in the light of the
issues just addressed, it is tempting to think that the disagreement
between George and Judith (on the question of who is in violation of
public reason) would have to be settled by reference to some standard
or criterion external to their own interchange on the issue. For
example, it is tempting to think that the disagreement has to be settled
by reference to some stock of existing beliefs or opinions that can
"externally" or "objectively" determine whose view and which person
(i.e., George or Judith) should be regarded as "reasonable" (and
"unreasonable") in the interchange.
But there are problems with any such appeal to a stock of existing
beliefs or opinions. First of all, if such appeal were made, then the
person eventually judged to be unreasonable and in violation of public
reason would be quite likely to reject that judgment (and reject the
alleged normativity of the existing beliefs appealed to), just as he or
she has already rejected the judgment of his or her opposing citizen-
interlocutor. In other words, there is no reason to believe that George
(or Judith) would willingly accept the judgment that he or she is being
unreasonable, if that judgment is made on the basis of a stock of
existing beliefs which themselves happen to contradict the beliefs held
by George (or Judith). However, there is a further problem: On what
basis is some set of existing beliefs to be taken as normative for
determining who or what counts as "reasonable" in the context of a
disagreement about public reason? It seems that such existing beliefs
could be taken as normative for two possible reasons: either because
these existing beliefs happen to be held by an identifiable majority of
other persons (beyond George and Judith themselves), or else
because these beliefs are deemed to be uncontentiously "true" in
some sense. But as we have already seen, the nature, scope, and limits
of Rawlsian public reason cannot be determined simply on the basis of
"majority opinion" or on the basis of "truth." Of course, one could
respond here that the nature, scope, and limits of public reason may
indeed be determined by appealing to the majority opinion, if this
majority opinion is the opinion of reasonable people (and not just any
people). Unfortunately, this response does not ultimately resolve the
issue at hand, but only pushes it back one step further. For the very
thing at issue is the question of who counts as a "reasonable person"
(within the context of public reason), and-in the absence of any
further qualifying conditions-it is normatively vacuous to say that the
opinions of a majority of "reasonable" people can determine who (in
the disagreement between George and Judith) is being "reasonable."
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In the remainder of this Essay, I would like to suggest a way in
which it may be possible to think meaningfully about the
requirements imposed by public reason, but without appealing
(problematically or illicitly) to a stock of existing beliefs which are
supposed to serve (because they are either "true" or held by a
majority of people) as an external standard for determining who is
actually correct when there is disagreement about who is or is not
acting in violation of public reason. In other words, I would now like
to suggest that a meaningful sense of public reason can be derived
from what is immanent to the very interchange and disagreement
between George and Judith themselves (and by implication, between
any citizens represented by them). If one reflects further on the
implications of the self-referentiality that (as we have begun to see)
characterizes public reason, then an important inference can be
drawn: If there is actual disagreement between George and Judith on
what is demanded of them by public reason, and if each claims that the
other has violated the requirements of public reason, then-we can
infer-the requirements of public reason really have been violated by at
least one of them. In other words, if each of them claims that the other
has acted in violation of public reason, then at least one of them is
correct and the other really has violated the requirements of public
reason. (Of course, both can be correct about the other's having
violated the requirements of public reason, but they cannot both be
correct about some particular alleged violation about which they
disagree.)
The important point here is that it is possible to know on immanent
grounds alone (i.e., simply through the fact that George and Judith
disagree about which of them has violated public reason, and with no
necessary reliance on an external standard such as "majority opinion"
or "truth") that there has indeed been a violation of public reason.
The demonstration is as follows. If Judith accuses George of having
violated public reason with respect to a particular discursive practice
of his (e.g., she objects to his ongoing attempts to persuade her, since
she believes that his arguments appeal to reasons that should be
disallowed from the public sphere), then she is either right or wrong in
that accusation. If she is right, then there has indeed been a violation
of public reason, since (as she correctly claims) George has violated
public reason. If, on the other hand, she is wrong in making that
accusation, then her own discursive practice (i.e., her very own
accusation) itself constitutes a violation of public reason, in which
case-once again-there has indeed been a violation of public reason.
This is because her accusation entails the claim that George should be
disallowed from making certain arguments in the public sphere. But if
George insists that his arguments do not violate public reason, and if
he is correct in so insisting, then Judith's claim that George should be
disallowed from making such arguments in the public sphere is itself
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unfair and a violation of the duty of civility, and thus it is contrary to
the requirements of public reason (and reciprocally, George is correct
to claim that it is Judith who has violated public reason). In short, if
George and Judith disagree on which of the two of them is in violation
of public reason, then Judith's accusation about George entails that
there has actually been a violation of public reason (if not by George,
then by Judith herself).
Since the stances taken by George and Judith are the mirror images
of one another (each claims that the other is in violation of public
reason), a similar analysis emerges if one focuses on George's claims
about Judith. If George and Judith disagree on which of the two of
them is in violation of public reason, then the very fact that George
accuses Judith of violating public reason (and Judith disagrees and
regards the accusation as unfair) entails that there actually has been a
violation of public reason (if not by Judith, then by George himself).43
Notice that-whether applied to George or to Judith-this analysis
works because the concept of public reason is an intrinsically
"intersubjective" or "reciprocal" concept. The concept simply has no
normative significance if there are not two or more citizens who are
able to disagree about the requirements of public reason and thus
disagree about who is or is not living up to the requirements of public
reason. Furthermore, as soon as there is any actual disagreement
between citizens regarding who is or is not in violation of public
reason, the very concept of public reason acquires a kind of self-
referentiality. When such disagreement exists, the concept takes on a
self-referential character because any actual claim that some other
citizen has acted in violation of public reason is by its very nature a
discursive practice that either (a) accurately describes some actual
violation of public reason by another citizen, or (b) itself constitutes a
violation of public reason. Because of the intersubjectivity and self-
referentiality built into the very idea of public reason, it follows that if
there is actual disagreement between citizens about what is required
of them under public reason and if one citizen accuses another of
violating public reason (in which case the accused citizen would claim
that he or she is being unfairly accused), then-as a matter of fact-
public reason has actually been violated. Stated differently, there is
43. In this analysis, I do not consider the possibility that George and Judith-in
spite of their reciprocal charges against one another-are both completely
misinformed about the nature and requirements of public reason. I do not consider
this possibility here, because there is no need to do so. As I argued earlier, if the
notion of public reason is to have any meaningful normative content for George and
Judith, then it must be possible for them to disagree on which of the two of them is in
violation of public reason and yet nevertheless-in the midst of such disagreement-
for one of them to be correct. See supra Part III. But if one starts with the hypothesis
that George and Judith are both completely misinformed about public reason, then-
contrary to a necessary condition of our analysis here-it is no longer possible for one
of them to be correct in the midst of their disagreement.
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something self-confirming or self-validating about any accusation
within the context of actual disagreement about public reason itself
that some other citizen has violated the requirements of public
reason.
44
The foregoing observations show that it is possible to claim
meaningfully and correctly that there has been a violation of public
reason, without having to justify this claim by showing that the
violator's discursive practices contradict norms that have been
gleaned from some stock of existing beliefs. In other words, the
meaningfulness of public reason does not have to be determined by
reference to some set of existing beliefs which somehow establish the
terms of what counts as reasonable discourse (either because such
beliefs are true or because they are held by a majority of people).
Rather, the meaningfulness of public reason-and the possibility of its
being violated-can be grounded in the simple fact of disagreement
between citizens about the nature and requirements of public reason
itself. Thus, the foregoing observations about public reason may help
open the way towards an understanding of Rawlsian public reason
that is not tied to any set of existing beliefs at all and that as a result is
more genuinely sensitive to the fact of radical pluralism and
disagreement.
But there is a further, perhaps more extraordinary implication to
the preceding analysis. This analysis shows that in the midst of actual
disagreement about public reason, it is possible for a citizen (e.g.,
George, Judith, or anyone represented by them) to be sure that there
has indeed been a violation of public reason, yet without being sure
that one's own discursive practice was not itself the cause of the
violation. In other words, it is possible for a citizen to know that a
violation of public reason has actually occurred, but without being
able to foreclose the possibility that he (or she) himself (or herself)
was not the violator. In turn, this result shows just how the ideal of
public reason can remain a truly demanding imperative for every
citizen, even in the midst of that citizen's being absolutely certain that
a violation of public reason has occurred, and being firmly convinced
that the violator was someone else. For if in the midst of actual
disagreement a citizen could be certain not only that public reason
had been violated but also that he or she was not the violator, then
public reason-in this particular instance at least-would no longer
specify a genuine imperative for that citizen. After all, this citizen
would have already satisfied the imperative of public reason in this
44. In a similar vein, Michael Dummett observes that there is something self-
confirming or self-validating about the belief that evil exists: if one believes in the
existence of evil when in fact there is no evil, then this very belief is an illusion, in
which case there is evil. Michael Dummett, A Defence of McTaggart's Proof of the
Unreality of Time, 69 Phil. Rev. 497 (1960), reprinted in Truth and Other Enigmas 356
(1978).
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particular instance and the only further action required of him or her
would be to encourage or demand that some other person or persons
stop acting in violation of public reason. But if the spirit of Rawlsian
public reason teaches us anything, it teaches us that we should think of
public reason as imposing a constant and continuous imperative on us,
an imperative that calls for ongoing openness, even (and perhaps
especially) in the midst of our certain knowledge that a violation of
public reason has taken place and our firm conviction that we
ourselves were not the violator.45
What is meant by public reason, then, may not be fixed or
determinate at all, but may be perpetually "in the making."46 Thus it
is perhaps best to think of public reason, not in terms of any already-
existing set of beliefs or states of affairs, but simply as a task, an ideal,
an imperative. Conversely, it is probably altogether wrong-or at
least highly misleading-for Rawls to say (as he sometimes does) that
the normative content of public reason must be determined in
advance by reference to existing beliefs or "truths now widely
accepted."47
It should be clear by now that the interpretation suggested here
would greatly expand the scope of public reason. But it would not do
so by claiming that the stock of existing beliefs upon which public
reason is grounded must be broadened so as to include beliefs that
Rawls and Rawlsians have typically excluded. Rather, my
interpretation would expand the scope of public reason by regarding
45. In some respects, then, the imperative imposed by the ideal of public reason is
similar to Kant's notion of a categorical imperative. For as Kant makes clear, it is
possible for me to know with assurance that the categorical imperative has been
violated in a particular instance, but never possible for me to know with assurance
that I myself have successfully lived up to what the categorical imperative requires of
me. See Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), reprinted
in Immanuel Kant: Ethical Philosophy 19 (James Ellington trans., 1983).
46. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 20, at 582 ("Political
liberalism, then, does not try to fix public reason once and for all .....
47. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 225.
As we have said, on matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice, the
basic structure and its public policies are to be justifiable to all citizens, as
the principle of political legitimacy requires. We add to this that in making
these justifications we are to appeal only to presently accepted general beliefs
and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and
conclusions from science when these are not controversial. The liberal
principle of legitimacy makes this the most appropriate, if not the only, way
to specify the guidelines of public inquiry.... This means that in discussing
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice we are not to appeal to
comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines.., nor to elaborate
economic theories of general equilibrium, say, if these are in dispute. As far
as possible, the knowledge and ways of reasoning that ground our affirming
the principles of justice and their application to constitutional essentials and
basic justice are to rest on the plain truths now widely accepted, or available,
to citizens generally.
Id. at 224-25 (emphases added).
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public reason as an essentially practical idea or imperative, and thus
by asserting the radical primacy of the practical.48 In so doing, my
interpretation would altogether deny that the scope of public reason is
to be established by reference to any antecedently determinable,
theoretically ascertainable, or empirically observable state of affairs or
set of existing beliefs. Following Aristotle-and following one of
Rawls's own observations49 -my suggestion is that public reason is
simply the imperative or ideal that properly governs the practical
activity known as "civic friendship." And as Aristotle indicates, civic
friendship consists not in any already-established state of affairs, but
in an activity; and ideally it is the activity of ruling and being ruled in
turn5" whereby no individual knows with assurance and in advance of
actual enquiry and debate whether his or her own view should serve
as the "measure or rule" for others or rather should be modified to
conform to the "rule or measure" offered by others.
In conclusion, I would like to return to the discussion with which I
began, namely Kant's discussion in the Critique of Pure Reason
regarding "The Discipline of Reason With Regard to Its Polemical
Use" (and it is this discussion to which Rawls refers when he first
introduces his account of public reason in Political Liberalism)." In
this discussion, Kant argues that reason is essentially dialogical, and as
a result "it is quite absurd to expect enlightenment from reason and
yet to prescribe to it in advance on which side it must come out."52 If
there is a lesson to be extracted from this Kantian passage, then
perhaps it is that Rawlsian public reason-like Kantian reason-is not
tied to any stock of existing beliefs, but is essentially an ideal, an
imperative, a task that cannot be pre-determined in advance of its
own self-unfolding. And in one of his more powerful statements on
the matter, Rawls seems to agree: "As an ideal conception of
citizenship for a constitutional democratic regime, [public reason]
presents how things might be, taking people as a just and well-ordered
society would encourage them to be. It describes what is possible and
can be, yet may never be, though no less fundamental for that. '5 3
48. Elsewhere I have offered a reading of Rawlsian contractualism that similarly
asserts the radical primacy of the practical. Michael Baur, Reversing Rawls:
Criteriology, Contractualism, and the Primacy of the Practical, in Phil. & Soc.
Criticism, May 2002, at 251-96.
49. Rawls, Collected Papers, supra note 20, at 579.
50. Aristotle, The Politics 92 (Carnes Lord trans., 1984) (n.p., n.d.).
51. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
52. Kant, supra note 4, at 647.
53. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 1, at 213.
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